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CYBERBULLYING – WHEN DOES A SCHOOL
AUTHORITY’S LIABILITY IN TORT END?
ROBERT PELLETIER*, BORIS HANDAL+, JESSICA KHALIL**
AND TRYON FRANCIS

#

ABSTRACT
Cyberbullying in schools is increasing on an alarming rate. The
development of the Internet and smartphone technology have
increased the potential scope of a school authority’s duty of care for
its students. A question frequently asked by educators is “Where
does a school authority’s duty of care end in the interconnected,
24/7 world of the Internet?” This paper argues that a duty of care
will be owed where the school is in a school/student relationship
with its students. That relationship can exist outside the school gates
and outside of school hours.
There are no decisions of senior appellate courts that deal with a
school authority’s liability for cyberbullying. The authors,
therefore, analyse the nature of the relationship to identify the key
features that must be present to establish the existence of a duty of
care. Three features are identified as critical to the existence of the
duty of care outside of the normal school hours. They are the extent
to which the school authority controls or ought to control a given
situation, the extent to which it has encouraged students to
participate in a particular activity and the extent to which a school
authority is aware or ought to be aware of risks associated with the
relevant activity of its students.
*
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INTRODUCTION

At 5am on 5 February 2010, 17 year old Allem Halkic ended his life by
jumping from Melbourne’s West Gate Bridge. He had been receiving
threatening text messages from his friend Shane Philip Gerada. Gearda
pleaded guilty to stalking and was placed on an 18 month Community
Based Order. He reflected on what had happened saying: ‘I did not realise
the effect of my words’.1
Welcome to the terrifying reality of cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is the
deliberate, repeated and hostile use of information and communication
technologies that seeks to intimidate, control, manipulate, put down or
humiliate a victim.2 It extends from situations of petty nastiness or cruelty
through to identity theft, harassment, stalking, and threats of physical
harm.3
In practical terms, today’s school bullies participate in all the traditional
physical and psychological schoolyard bullying that generations of school
kids have indulged in or struggled to survive. But the advent of mobile
phones and the World Wide Web have increased their arsenal: school
bullies create wikis and blogs; circulate emails, post images, message
1

Selma Milovanovic, ‘Man avoids jail in first cyber bullying case ‘, The Age
(online) 9 April 2010 <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/man-avoids-jail-in-firstcyber-bullying-case-20100408-rv3v.html> and see the report of the report of the
Coroner, Inquest into the Death of Allem Halkic Court reference COR 2009 0655
dated 27 June 2012.
2
Bill Belsey, Always On? Always Aware! (17 January 2007) Cyberbullying
<http://www.cyberbullying.ca>; Youth Affairs Council of Victoria Inc, Sticks and
stones and mobile phones: outcomes on a forum on bullying and young people in
Victoria (November 2009) 12.
3
Kelly Tallon et al, 'New Voices / New Laws : school-age young people in
New South Wales speak out about the criminal laws that apply to their online
behaviour' (Research Report, National Children's and Youth Law Centre and Legal
Aid NSW, November 2012) 14-5.
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texts and images, upload, download and network unsociably to harm their
victims. 4 In short, they use all the tools that are their inheritance as
internet natives to hurt and humiliate their victims or, simply, to have fun
at others’ expense. This is the brave new world of cyberbullying where
the bully has the advantage of anonymity.5 With a few keystrokes the
harm is done. From the bully’s perspective, it is a bloodless sport. The
online bully cannot see the bleeding nose or the despair in the eye of his
or her victim.6
As with all bullying, there is a perceived or actual power imbalance. The
victim’s perception is that he or she is less powerful than the bully. In
traditional bullying, the imbalance may be caused by the bully’s greater
strength. In cyberbullying the relative physical strength of those involved
is relevant. The imbalance may be caused by the bully’s greater
technological skills.7
Cyberbullying does not recognise geographical boundaries: school gates
cannot keep it out and the victim’s home is no refuge. Once posted to the
internet, cyberbullying is up and running 24/7.

8

Perhaps, most

disturbingly, once on the internet, the hurtful post or the humiliating
image has indefinite virtual life and the potential audience is exponential

4

Sheri Bauman, ‘Cyber bullying: a virtual menace’ (Paper presented at
National Coalition Against Bullying National Conference, Melbourne, November 2 –
4, 2007) 3.
5
Aashish Srivastava and Janice Boey, 'Online Bullying and Harrassment: An
Australian Perspective,' (2012) 6 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology
299, 305.
6
Robert Slonje and Peter K Smith, ‘Cyberbullying: Another main type of
bullying?’ (2008) April, 49:2 Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 147
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ipacez.nd.edu.au/enhanced/doi/10.1111/j.14679450.2007.00611.x/>.
7
Elizabeth Whittaker & Robin M. Kowalski (2015) ‘Cyberbullying Via Social
Media’ (2015) 14(1) Journal of School Violence, 11, 12.
8
Srivastava and Boey, above n 6, 305.
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– especially if the bullying post, video or image goes viral.9 It is little
wonder cyberbullying is causing school authorities, teachers, parents and
guardians increasing concern and despair.

II

THE ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE

How are school authorities supposed to react to the continually evolving
world of bullying on the internet? Is it possible to draw clear lines of
legal responsibility? Where and when, for example, does a school’s duty
of care to its students start and finish?
A school authority’s liability in tort is based on the duty of care it owes to
those who have a relationship with it. It is the nature of the relationship
that determines the extent and scope of the duty. A school authority, for
example, owes a duty of care to its students for situations that can be said
to be part of the duty relationship of school and student.10 However, the
following discussion indicates that the existence of that relationship is not
necessarily limited to when the student is on school premises during
school hours or at a school event.11
Of course, the existence of a duty of care is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of liability in negligence. Having established that a
duty of care exists, a court must establish that:

9

Marilyn Campbell, Des Butler and Sally Kift, 'School's Duty to Provide a
Safe Learning Environment: Does this Include Cyberbullying,' (2008) 13 Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 21, 22.
10
Phillip T Slee and David C Ford, 'Bullying is a Serious Issue - it is a Crime'
(1999) 4 Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 23, 33; The
Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne (1981) 150 CLR 258.
11
Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150
CLR 258; and Reynolds v Haines (SC(NSW) Common Law Division, McLaughlin M,
27 October 1993, unreported); Katherine A. Lindsay, 'After the Bell: School
Authorities' Duty of Care to Pupils After School Hours Case Note' (1997) 2 Australia
& New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 101.
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1. the school authority breached its duty to the student;
2. the breach caused harm to the student; and

3. the harm was not too remote 12
to find that a school authority is liable to the student in negligence. A
close reading of the cases indicates that the questions of the existence of
the duty of care, the breach, causation and remoteness are very closely
related and considerations of them by the Courts tend to blur.13
However, the precondition of the school authority being legally
responsible for the effects of cyberbullying only arise once the existence
of a duty of care has been established. Therefore, focus should be placed
on understanding the factors that limit a school authority’s duty of care in
the minefield created by the internet. In particular focus should be placed
on the existence and scope of the duty of care owed by a school authority
for events that occur outside of school hours and away for school
premises. Causation and remoteness are beyond the scope of this article.
There has not yet been a decision by an appellate court in Australia on the
duty of school authorities for cyberbullying.14 Therefore, we have to go
back to basic principles to establish the limits of a school authority’s
liability and apply those principles to cyberbullying. We also draw on
analogies from the law of workers’ compensation to see where the Courts
have found that an employment relationship exists – outside of the work
environment and outside of work hours. The use of these analogies is,
this paper argues, justified because the rapidly evolving nature of the
12

RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed,
2013) 192.
13
Prue Vines, Peter Handford and Carol Harlow, ‘Duty of Care’ in Carolyn
Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 2011), 151,
152.
14
Campbell, Butler and Kift, above n 10, 25.
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employment relationship has raised very similar issues – albeit in a
different context to the school authority/student relationship.
The authors’ conclusion is that there is no hard and fast guide to where
the duty relationship starts and finishes outside the school gates and
outside of school hours. There are, however, factors that increase the risk
that a school authority may be held responsible that can be distilled from
the cases. The risk that a school authority owes a duty of care will be
greater where the school authority:
 has knowledge or ought to have knowledge that a risk of harm to
its students exist;
 has control or ought to have control of a particular situation; and
 has induced or encouraged its students to take part in a particular
activity.
Critical to the law’s thinking in relation to the existence of a duty of care,
is the awareness that students are particularly vulnerable; given their age
and inexperience, students are prone to mischief. As a result they depend
on the school authority to provide a safe environment for the student to
work and socialize in when the relationship of student and school exists.
A

Back to basic: The school authority’s duty of care

In this ever-morphing environment, it is not possible to draw absolutely
clear lines of legal responsibility. The duty of care relationship, which is
the foundation of liability in negligence, arises in situations where the
relationship of school and student exist.15 In particular, that relationship
exists in situations where the school has control or ought to be exercising
15

Slee and Ford, above n 11, 33; The Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne
(1981) 150 CLR 258.
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control to ensure that its students’ learning and social environment are
safe. 16 Or, to look at it from the students’ or their parents/‘guardians’
perspective, a duty will arise in situations where it is legitimate for the
student or his or her parents/guardians to depend on the school to provide
a safe learning and social environment – regardless of whether the
relevant activity takes physically place at the school or on the internet.
The greater the obligation of the school authority to control a given
situation, the more likely it is that a court will find that a duty of care
exists.17
In the older duty of care cases there is often a physical connection
between the school and the student: when a school opens its gates to
students,18 takes them on excursions or stages an event for its students,19
the cases make clear that the school authority owes a duty of care to its
students. The internet and mobile phones, however, potentially extend the
school/student relationship way beyond the physical boundaries of a
school or the location of an excursion and way outside of school hours.
While many cases of cyberbullying lack this physical connection, there
are useful principles that can be drawn from the older school negligence
cases that shed light on the extent on the limits of liability of school
authorities for cyberbullying in negligence. The duty of a school authority
to provide a safe environment for its students has been described as a
‘personal duty’ that cannot be delegated to another person or entity.20
This means that, even if the school authority engages another person or
16

Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672, 684-7 cited with
approval in New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4, [35].
17
Ibid.
18
Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258.
19
Guigiatti v Servite College Council Inc (2004) Aus Torts Reports 81-724,
[19].
20
Campbell, Butler and Kift, above n 10, 25.
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entity to discharge its duties, it is legally responsible for the consequences
of that other person or entity’s negligence even if it has little, if any,
control, over how that other person or entity carries out the work. It still
has a duty to ensure that a safe environment is provided to its students.21
The non-delegable nature of the duty arises because of the vulnerability
of the students and their dependence on the school authority to ensure
that a safe environment is provided.22
A school authority can be directly responsible for its own failure to
provide a safe environment for its students.23 Examples of the potential
for direct liability occurs when a school authority employs an unsuitable
teacher without carrying out proper reference checking, fails to supervise
its staff properly or fails to ensure that its policies on internet use and
appropriate behaviour are complied with and a student is harmed as a
result.24
In addition to the personal responsibility of a school authority, it can be
legally responsible for the negligence of its staff provided that the
negligence occurred in the course of the staff member’s employment. In
Ramsay v Larsen,25 Kitto J said that:
...a schoolmaster's power of reasonable chastisement exists, at least
under a system of compulsory education, not by virtue of a
delegation by the parent at all, but by virtue of the nature of the

21

Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) HCA 40, [27]–[29] (Mason J).
New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4, [100] (Gaudron J).
23
Commonwealth v Introvigne 150 CLR 258, 269; cited in Watson v Haines
(1987) ATR ¶80-094, 3; Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis (1985) AC 549,
270.
24
New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4 [2] (Gleeson CJ).
25
Ramsay v Larsen [1964] HCA 40.
22
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relationship of schoolmaster and pupil and the necessity inherent in
that relationship of maintaining order in and about the school. 26

His Honour went on to explain that a school authority is liable for the
failure of its staff to take due care of a student. This is the notion of
vicarious liability.27 Because of this principle, a school authority may be
liable for those whom it employs to care for its students.28 His Honour’s
focus is on the nature of the relationship of schoolmaster and pupil and
the school master’s obligation to maintain order as the heart of the duty
relationship.
Justice Taylor emphasized the importance of the student becoming
subject to the ‘care and authority of masters’.29
As argued in the rest of this paper, later cases are consistent and that the
duty of care arises when the relationship of teacher/school authority and
student exists. Authority is based on control. So, it can be said, in
situations where a school authority exercises or should exercise control
based on their authority – a duty of care will arise.
Students’ immaturity and their talent for getting up to no good are key
considerations. According to Mason J, children’s talent for trouble
imposes a ‘special responsibility on a school authority to care for their
safety, one that goes beyond a mere vicarious liability for the acts and
omissions of its servants’.30 The same point was made by Murphy J: ‘The
standard of care must take into account the well-known mischievous

26

Ibid [7].
Martin Davies and Ian Malkin, Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed,
2012) 633.
28
Ramsay v Larsen [1964] HCA 40, [10].
29
Ibid [38].
30
Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) HCA 40, [30] (Mason J).
27
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propensities of children, especially in relation to attractions and lures with
obvious or latent hazards.’31
The leading Australian case on the duty of care owed by a school to its
students is Geyer v Downs.32 It is clear from that decision that the school
can create the relationship irrespective of whether or not a particular
activity occurred in school hours. Justice Stephen pointed out that the
duty owed by a teacher (or a school authority) to a pupil arises from the
relationship between them. It is not determined by school hours but by
reference to periods when the student is entrusted to the school ‘for the
purpose of his education.’33 His Honour went on to say that:
The temporal ambit of the duty will, therefore, depend not at all upon
the schoolmaster's ability, however derived, effectively to perform
the duty but, rather, upon whether the particular circumstances of the
occasion in question reveal that the relationship of schoolmaster and
pupil was or was not then in existence. If it was, the duty will apply.
It will be for the schoolmaster and those standing behind him to cut
their coats according to the cloth, not assuming the relationship when
unable to perform the duty which goes with it. 34

What is critical is that the duty goes with the relationship and that is not
dependent on the negligence occurring in school hours.
Significantly, Stephen J also emphasised that the duty arises when the
student is ‘beyond the control and protection of his parent.’ 35 His
Honour’s warning to schools that they should not extend their duty of
31

Ibid [2].
Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64.
33
Ibid [5]. His Honour cited the decision of Winneke CJ in Richards v Victoria
(1996) VR 136, 138-9 about the nature of the duty with approval.
34
Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [6].
35
Citing the judgment of Winneke CJ in Richards v. Victoria (1969) VR 136,
138-9.
32
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care to relationship to situations where they are unable to provide a safe
environment is excellent advice.
The scary reality is that, in the messy world of cyberbullying, students, as
internet natives, may be beyond the control of his or her parents and his
or her school.
Justices Murphy and Aicken, in their joint judgment, made a vital point
that the nature and extent of the duty of care relationship is, in large part,
determined by the culture in which the relationship arises:
... What may be a useful guide [from the nineteenth century cases on
the nature and extent of the duty of care] applicable to a village or a
small country school cannot be of direct assistance in the case of a
large city or suburban school with some hundreds of children
attending it. 36

In other words, the social context in which the schooling is carried out
plays a key role in determining the extent and scope of the duty of care.
Consequently, the nature of the duty changes as the cultural context
changes.
This has obvious relevance to nature and extent of a school authority’s
potential liability in the internet and smart phone age. The key point
being that a school authority’s duty or care maybe extended to include
maintaining proper supervision, having appropriate policies and training
of any website, blog, wiki or other internet wonderland that it created or
is responsible for.

36

Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [18].
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If the duty is not dependent on the negligence occurring in school hours,
it is also clear that the existence of the duty is not dependent on the
negligence occurring in school premises or on a school sponsored event.
In 1996, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Trustees of the Roman
Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman and anor
considered the liability of a school authority for injuries sustained by a 12
year old student who, after his school day had finished, walked 300 to
400 meters to the bus stop.37 While waiting for the bus, students from a
state high school adjoining the bus stop, harassed and threw objects at the
plaintiff injuring him in the eye. Building on Geyer v Downs, Mahoney P,
dissenting, was prepared to extent the school’s duty of care beyond the
school boundaries:
… the obligation of the school to do things for the safety of the
pupil, will require to be done will depend upon the circumstances.
Thus, if it is plain to the school that, immediately outside the
school premises, there is a busy and therefore dangerous road, the
school will ordinarily have an obligation to shepherd pupils of a
young age across the road. But if, in the course of walking from
school to home, the student has reason to cross a busy road two
kilometres from the school, it does not follow that the obligation
of the school to take precautions for the safety of the student will
involve that it shepherd the student across the road. 38

The fact that the school has the capacity to influence what happens
‘immediately outside the school premises.’39 The further the student is
from the school and therefore the more outside the school’s control, the
37

Lindsay, above n 12; Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese
of Bathurst v Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339.
38
Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v
Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339, 63589.
39
Ibid.
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less likely it is that a duty of care will arise. However, the distance may
not rule out the existence of a duty of care where the school has particular
knowledge of risks:
I do not mean by this that a school may not have some
obligations in respect of pupil safety even two kilometres from
the school. Thus, if the school was made aware that, at that
place, the student was habitually molested, it might arguably
have an obligation, inter alia, to draw that matter to the attention
of the parents, the police or others. I have referred to these
examples to illustrate that what the obligation to take precautions
in respect of a pupil's safety will require the school to do will
vary according to the circumstances of time, place and
otherwise. 40

Mahoney P’s analysis blends the questions of whether or not a duty of
care exists with the question of what that duty requires. Once the school
is aware of risk of a particularly dangerous situation immediately outside
the school premises, it probably has obligations to supervise students in
that unsafe situation. Indeed, according to Justice Mahoney, it is arguable
that the school may have obligations that extend beyond the immediate
vicinity of the school if it is aware of a particular risk.
Although Mahoney P dissented, in broad terms, his view that a school’s
duty is not limited by the school gates, was accepted by the rest of the
Court of Appeal. Justice Sheller was of the view that the nature and
extent of the duty is not dependent on the student being on school
grounds:

40

Ibid.
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I do not think the relationship of teacher and pupil begins each
day when the pupil enters the school ground and terminates
when the pupil leaves the school ground. Undoubtedly however
a particular duty of care arises because of the pre-existing
relationship.
In my opinion the extent and nature of the duty of the teacher to
the pupil is dictated by the particular circumstances. I do not
think its extent is necessarily measured or limited by the
circumstance that the final bell for the day has rung and the pupil
has walked out the school gate. 41

At its broadest, Koffman suggests that, if teachers are aware of a risk to
their students, there may be a duty to take preventative steps or warn
parents of the risk, even when it arises outside school grounds and outside
of school hours.
This has obvious implications for life on the internet where the school
may be aware that a particular student has either been at risk of bullying
or been a perpetrator of internet bullying. The school may also be aware
that inappropriate posts or images are being placed on sites that it is
responsible for. The knowledge of the risk in those circumstances is more
likely to give rise to the existence of a duty on the school to mitigate or
eliminate any risks to its students in those situations.
Priestly JA agreed that a duty of care existed. For his Honour, the
existence of a duty of care depends on the particular circumstances of the
situation rather than the limit of school hours.42

41

Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v
Koffman and anor (1996) Aust Torts Report ¶81-339, 63597.
42
Ibid 63593.
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However, there are limits to this extended duty. As Justice Shellar
pointed out, an employer is not liable to ensure that an employee’s
bathroom floor is not slippery.43 Similarly, the school’s duty is limited in
scope and depends on the circumstances. His Honour gave the following
example:
The circumstances of a small country high school located
beside a quiet street and a primary school located on a busy
highway in a big city may be contrasted. In the first case older
children leave the environs of the school in comparative safety.
In the second small children emerge from the school into a
situation of immediate danger. 44

The consistent emphasis on the importance of the particular
circumstances of the school and the student is a consistent theme in these
judgments. They echo the stress placed by Murphy and Aicken JJ on
cultural context in Geyer v Downs to understand the nature of the duty of
care relationship.45
In 2001, the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in
Graham v The State of New South Wales demonstrated that there are
limits to the duty of care.46 The Court considered the case of a young
High School student with poor eye sight and balance. This student was
severely injured crossing a busy road on her way home from High
School.

43
44
45
46

Ibid 63597.
Ibid.
Geyer v Downs [1977] HCA 64, [30].
Graham v The State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 248.
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Generally her mother would walk her home. Her mother asked the school
to provide the student with transport if she was unavailable. The school
declined to do so and notified the mother that it would not provide
transport.47 On the day of the accident, the plaintiff’s mother did not walk
home with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured crossing the busy road
on her way home. She sued the State of New South Wales as the relevant
school authority for her loss. She relied on Koffman to argue that the
school owed a duty to transport her home if her mother was not available
to walk her home.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. According to Meager JA:
No doubt the school had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
the child whilst it was at school, and this it apparently did. There
may also have been a duty to inform Miss Graham's parents that
neither taxi nor bus was running, and this it certainly did. There is
no duty, in my opinion, to go further to take precautions to escort a
pupil like Miss Graham to her home. Except in exceptional
circumstances the master/pupil relationship ceases to exist at the
school boundary. 48

Relevant factors where the plaintiff’s age, she was a twelve year old High
School student, the school was aware of her difficulties but had let the
parents know that it could not provide transport. Mason P said that:
It doesn't really do anything, on the facts of this case, to assist the
plaintiff in showing that the considered decision not to make

47
48

Graham v NSW (2001) 34 MVR 198, 198.
Ibid [5].
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available this added form of protection was one which was
unreasonable in the circumstances. 49

The important point for schools to take from this case is that they need to
be very clear about what they will take responsibility for and what they
will not. The Court made clear that it is only in rare cases that the duty of
care will extend beyond the school gate.

B

Duty of Care and scope of the duty must be considered
together

It is unreal to isolate the question of the existence of the duty of care from
the other elements that must be established in a negligence claim. In
Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,50 Gummow J
observed that:
...duties of care are not owed in the abstract. Rather, they are
obligations of a particular scope, and that scope may be more or less
expansive depending on the relationship in question. Secondly,
whatever their scope, all duties of care are to be discharged by the
exercise of reasonable care. They do not impose a more stringent or
onerous burden.
Regarding the first point, a duty of care involves a particular and
defined legal obligation arising out of a relationship between an
ascertained defendant (or class of defendants) and an ascertained
plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs). 51

49
50
51

Ibid [9].
Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer [2007] HCA 42.
Ibid [42]–[44].
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The existence of the duty of care always has a particular scope that is
made up of a number of “particular and defined” legal obligations that are
summarised in the obligation to take reasonable care. This is what we saw
in Koffman where each judge of the Court of Appeal analysed the
existence and scope of the duty of care owed by the School authority
together.
So, for example, the scope of the duty that is owed to a primary school
child will be different from the duty owed to a High School student. As
the student gets older, the demands of the duty of care change. Thus in
Camkin v Bishop and another Goddard LJ held that:
Boys of 14 and 16 at a public school are not to be treated as if
they were infants at creches, and no headmaster is obliged to
arrange for constant and perpetual watching out of school
hours.52

Justice Steytler in the West Australian Supreme Court cited this passage
from Goddard LJ in Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc. 53 His
Honour, giving the Court’s judgment, held that the School authority was
not negligent in was not reasonable to expect one of its teachers
preventing a sixteen year old on a school leadership camp from jumping
over a modest creek and thereby injuring himself.54

1

Employment analogies

Analogies can be drawn from the law of employment where the law has
had a similar struggle to keep abreast of rapid developments in working
52

Camkin v Bishop and another [1941] 2 All ER 713, 717 cited with approval
by Steytler J in Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc [2004] WASC 5, [23]
(Gugiatti).
53
Gugiatti v Servite College Council Inc [2004] WASCA 5.
54
Ibid [24].
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relationships. Caution needs to be applied in working with these
analogies because the cases we consider involves adults – who are not as
vulnerable as children and can, therefore, be expected to be more
responsible for their own safety. They are also concerned with the
interpretation of the relationship based on construction of relevant
statutes as opposed to the common law notion of a duty of care.
Bearing those very important caveats in mind, the legal issues of where
does the employment relationship end and, consequently, what are the
limits of an employer’s liability, are very similar to that posed by the
school authority/student relationship. These issues have been considered
in the context of workers' compensation cases.
In Hatzimanolis v ANI Corp Limited, 55 the High Court considered
whether an injury sustained by a worker on a sightseeing journey on his
day off was sustained in the course of his employment for the purpose of
section 9 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). According to
the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh
JJ, an activity is within the course of employment even though it is
outside a period of actual work if ‘the employer, expressly or impliedly,
has induced or encouraged the employee to spend the interval or interlude
at a particular place or in a particular way.’56
Their Honours noted an injury sustained in an interval between periods of
actual work (eg, during a lunch break) is more likely to be interpreted as
occurring in the course of employment than an injury occurring between
two discrete periods of work.57

55
56
57

Hatzimanolis v ANI Corp Limited (1992) 173 CLR 473.
Ibid [16].
Ibid [15].
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The continued relevance of this test was considered by the High Court in
Comcare v PVYW (PVYW). 58 The respondent in that case was an
employee of a Commonwealth Government agency. She provided
training at a regional office of the agency. She stayed overnight in a hotel
and had sexual intercourse with an acquaintance in the hotel room.
Whilst making love, either she or her acquaintance, pulled a light fitting
from its mount striking the respondent on the head – causing her physical
injury and psychological harm. She argued that the injury occurred in the
course of her employment under the Commonwealth’s Safety,
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.59
The High Court reiterated the Hatzimanolis test so that the employer is
liable provided the employee is ‘… doing the very thing that the
employer encouraged the employee to do, when the injury occurs.’ 60
Merely requiring an employee to be present at a place is insufficient.
Requiring the respondent to be present at a regional centre to conduct
training where this necessitated her stay overnight did not attract liability
if the employer had not also expressly or impliedly encouraged or
induced the employee to engage in the very activity that caused the
injury. Consequently, the injury did not occur in the course of the
respondent’s employment.61

58

Comcare v PVYW (PVYW) [2013] HCA 41.
Section 5A(1)(b).
60
PVYW [35]; see Eric L Windholz, ‘Comcare v PVYW: Are Injuries
Sustained While Having Sex on a Business Trip Compensable’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney
Law Review 345.
61
Ibid [46]–[49]. Eric Windholz in a very useful case note points out the
significance of the different statutory provisions giving rise to workers’ compensation
liability in different Australian jurisdictions (see ‘Comcare v PVYW: Are Injuries
Sustained While Having Sec on a Business Trip Compensable’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney
Law Review 345, 347.
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Applying this to a school authority, this paper argues that if the school
authority has expressly or impliedly encouraged or induced a student to
engage in the online activity that caused the injury, this may be taken as
an indication of an assumption of legal responsibility by the school. In
this context, the school should be confident that the activity it encourages
is risk free or, at the very least, it has done what is reasonably required to
mitigate that risk by, for example, properly educating its students, having
clear policies in place or moderating the activity.
Of course, the question is always one of degree and what is appropriate
will be determined by the nature of the activity and the student’s
involvement in it. If the school is aware of particular risks of the online
activity it is encouraging, then it should mitigate those risks or cease
encouraging its students to take part in the activity.

C

The duty is to do what is reasonable - breach of the Duty
of Care

Having said that, schools are not required to eliminate risk altogether.62
The law does not impose strict liability whereby a school authority may
be liable for damage sustained by a plaintiff regardless of whether or not
it acted reasonably.
The decision of the High Court in Roman Catholic Church v Hadba,63 for
example, makes clear that the school authority is not obliged to provide
constant supervision in all possible places of risk. According to the joint
judgment:
Nor is it reasonable to have a system in which children are
observed during particular activities for every single moment of
62
63

New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 531.
Roman Catholic Church v Hadba [2005] HCA 31.
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time - it is damaging to teacher-pupil relationships by removing
even the slightest element of trust; it is likely to retard the
development of responsibility in children, and it is likely to call
for a great increase in the number of supervising teachers and in
the costs of providing them. 64

In determining what is reasonable, and thereby concluding whether or not
the school authority has breached the duty of care it owes to students, in
New South Wales the Court must apply section 5B of the Civil Liability
Act, 2002 (NSW). This section states that:
(1)

A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions

against a risk of harm unless:
(a)

the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of

which the person knew or ought to have known), and
(b)

the risk was not insignificant, and

(c)

in the circumstances, a reasonable person in

the person’s position would have taken those precautions.
(2)

In determining whether a reasonable person would

have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to
consider the following (amongst other relevant things):
(a)

the probability that the harm would occur if

care were not taken,
(b)

the likely seriousness of the harm,

(c)

the burden of taking precautions to avoid the

risk of harm,

64

Ibid [25]–[26].
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the social utility of the activity that creates the

risk of harm. 65

According to Ipp J, the lead designer of the wave of tort reform that hit
Australia in 2002,66 this section was designed to embody the common law
principles that come from Lord Reid in Wagon Mound No 2 [1967] AC
388:
If a real risk is something that would occur to the mind of a
reasonable man in the position of the defendant's servant and
which he would not brush aside as far-fetched, and if the criterion
is to be what that reasonable man would have done in the
circumstances, then surely he would not neglect such a risk if
action to eliminate it presented no difficulty, involving no
disadvantage, and required no expense. 67

Lord Reid’s dicta was picked up by Mason CJ in Wyong Shire Council v
Shirt:
…when we speak of a risk of injury as being "foreseeable" we
are not making any statement as to the probability or
improbability of its occurrence, save that we are implicitly
asserting that the risk is not one that is far-fetched or fanciful.68

Having determined that a duty of care exists, Mason CJ explained that:
... it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable
man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the
reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the

65

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5B.
Martin Davies and Ian Malkin, Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed,
2012) 21.
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magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its
occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of
taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities
which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are
balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is
the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man
placed in the defendant’s position. 69

This has come to be known as the calculus of negligence.70 Essentially,
school authorities have to carry out a risk assessment – a process with
which we are all familiar from work health and safety requirements. The
measure against which a school authority’s performance is judged is what
a reasonable school authority would do in the circumstances.
Therefore, the existence of a duty of care owed by a school authority to a
student does not require perfection; it does not require the school
authority to prevent injury to its students at all costs but it does require
the school to take and enforce steps that are reasonable.
An excellent decision on how section 5B is applied is the decision of the
New South Wales Court of Appeal in State of New South Wales v
Mikhael.71 The plaintiff in that case was the victim of a serious assault by
T, a fellow year 8 student, at a High School operated by the State of New
South Wales. The plaintiff sustained brain damage as a result of the
assault by T following an argument in a class.
The plaintiff alleged that his injury had been caused by the negligence of
the school in failing to warn relevant teachers that T had a propensity for
violence. The plaintiff alleged that the failure of the school to implement
69
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its own policy of informing all relevant teachers of potential risks had
been the cause of this assault and his injuries. Specifically, the plaintiff
argued that the school failed to take reasonable care for him in
circumstances where early male teenage students are known to be
potentially violent and T, in particular, was known to be potentially
violent.72
Justice Beazley gave the decision of the Court. She emphasised the
importance of foreseeability of risk of injury.73 Applying Mason CJ’s test
of foreseeability from Wyong Shire Council, even a risk that is “quite
unlikely” can be foreseeable provided it is not far-fetched or fanciful.74
Given that T had carried out a serious assault only some weeks before he
assaulted the plaintiff, the risk of injury was clearly foreseeable.75 Her
Honour found the risk of harm was not insignificant and were such a
reasonable person in the school’s position would have taken precautions
to deal with the risk.
Having satisfied the conditions set out in section 5B(1), her Honour
applied the factors set out in sub-section (2). These factors are to be
applied to “the extent that they are relevant”.76 The School had come to
the conclusion that there was a low risk of T reoffending. However, if he
did reoffend, the potential consequences could be and were very serious –
they were certainly not potentially insignificant such that no precautions
were necessary.77
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The Court must then consider the burden of taking precautions. As her
Honour points out, the burden is not to be analysed solely in economic
terms. In this case, the obvious precaution was proper communication to
relevant teachers who might have responsibility for T of his propensity
for violence. To calculate the burden, it is legitimate to take into account
“factors such as time or distance or communication”. 78 Weighing the
inconvenience of effective communication against T’s right to privacy.
Justice Beazley said of this consideration that:
It was the privacy concerns that had dictated that part of the
school's procedures which created the risk of harm. Privacy
concerns were appropriate and relevant considerations. However, a
different or more sensitively calibrated privacy policy, having
regard to particular circumstances, was required, so as to balance
the concerns of the physical safety and emotional security of all
students at the school. 79

Given the serious risk of harm, the privacy policy had to be dealt with in
a more considered manner. Ultimately, the potential risk was of such
seriousness, that it was vital that the school should have ensured that all
relevant staff members were informed of the risks created by T’s
propensity for violence.
Knowing these risks of injury exist that go beyond far-fetched or fanciful
risks, schools must carry out a risk assessment – considering all the
factors set out in section 5B. Having carried out that assessment it must
do what a reasonable school authority would do in the circumstances. In
carrying out that risk assessment, as discussed earlier, schools must be
aware of the propensity of their students for mischief and, as Mikhael
78
79
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illustrates, if the school is aware of the potential risks created by
particular students, it must manage those risks effectively. So the risk
assessment that schools are required to do must be done in full awareness
of Murphy’s law that what can go wrong probably will go wrong especially when dealing with students.

III

CONCLUSION

In summary, a duty of care will only arise in circumstances where the
relationship of school and student or teacher and student arises. This
relationship exists pre-eminently on school grounds when the school is
open for business. However, as Koffman illustrates, the duty can arise
outside the school grounds and outside of school hours – especially in
situations where the school is on notice of the risks or ought to be on
notice.
The duty and this teacher/student relationship arises in situations where
the school has control and the students legitimately depend on the school,
its delegates, teachers or staff to be looking after the student. The Courts
will be reluctant to hold that a duty exists in situations where the school
has no control and the student is under the supervision of others. If for
example, the student is in his or her home, the expectation will be that the
parents or guardians of the student will have responsibility.
The problem is, as discussed earlier, that the internet and smart phones do
not respect front doors, or other boundaries. Lines of control and
responsibility become blurred.
Where the school clearly exercises control, it is clear there is a duty
present. For example, If the school authority is responsible for a website,
a blog, wiki or other social networking site, it will be expected to
establish proper principles for the use of the internet, to educate its staff
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and students as to what is appropriate and what the limits are and to
supervise what occurs on those sites.
Similarly, schools will be expected to have clear and effective policies
about the use of smart phones, tablets and other internet devices while
students are under the control of the school. They will be expected to
police those policies effectively.
Where they are on notice that a particular student is vulnerable to
bullying, they need to be alert to the needs of that student. Similarly,
when a school is aware of the risks created by a particular student, it
needs to take steps to mitigate or eliminate that risk if it is anything more
than a far-fetched or fanciful one.
The Courts have consistently drawn attention to the need of school
authorities to have regard to students’ vulnerability and their propensity
for mischief. They also need to bear in mind that the young can be
ignorant of the effect of what they do on others.
Bearing in mind that children are immature, school authorities should
take particular care in relation to any online activities they encourage
students to take part. We have seen in the employment cases, that Courts
have been inclined to extend an employer’s responsibility to include
situations that it has encouraged an employee to take part. There is no
reason why the same kind of reasoning could not be applied to school
authorities and students.
The good news for school authorities is that its duty does not require it to
moderate sites 24/7 or to wrap its students in internet free bubble wrap. A
school can only do what is reasonable in the circumstances. This does not
mean that a school should be content with doing what it has always done
or what looks okay. Schools should not be content with drafting internet
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policies and allowing them to gather dust on the IT shelves of the library
or store them in some musty directory that no one ever refers to.
Because children are immature and therefore vulnerable, school
authorities owe a personal duty to their students. This duty arises because
the student is dependent on the school to deliver the safe environment.
So, while the requirements of the duty do not extend to creating a risk
free haven, school authorities are best advised to discharge their duties by
looking for and adopting best practice in their supervision of their own
online facilities and in what they allow students to get up to using their
own devices on school property.
Young people do silly things – a bit like adults really. They have a
propensity for mischief. The young man, Shane Gereada, who sent the
menacing text messages to his friend, Allem Halkic, did not realise the
consequences of his words and was, no doubt, appalled when they led to
his friend taking his own life. School authorities need to educate those in
their care about good internet citizenship and always be aware and
watchful for the risk of harm that exists in this brave new world. With the
tragic increase in youth suicides, the need for proper care by school
authorities could never have been be greater.

